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Transcripts

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? A Panel
Discussion on the Regulation of Political
Corruption
Moderator: Professor Lance Cole*
Panelists: Jennifer Ahearn,** Kathleen Clark,***
Arlo Devlin-Brown****
Lance Cole:
Thank you, Brett, and thank you to everyone for attending
today, and I especially want to thank all of the participants in the
symposium for coming here at the end of what has been a very
This is a transcript of a panel held at the Penn State Law Review's 2017 Symposium. The
transcript was lightly edited by the panelists and Law Review staff to make the transcript
more reader-friendly. The views expressed in this transcript are those of the panelists
alone.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Government Law and Public Policy
Studies at the Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
** Policy Counsel, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
*** Kathleen Clark practices law in Washington, D.C., and is the John S. Lehman
Research Professor at Washington University School of Law.
**** Arlo Devlin-Brown is a partner in the White Collar Defense and Investigations
Practice Group at Covington & Burling LLP. He previously served in the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, most recently as Chief of its
Public Corruption Unit.
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snowy week for us in central Pennsylvania. So, we are happy to
have you, and I also wanted to commend the editors at the Law
Review for putting this together. It is a great program and it's
very, very timely. And I suppose the best thing to do is start
with the McDonnell' case, as we've been very fortunate this
morning to have unique insights into the McDonnell case with
Mr. Brownlee's presentation 2 from the defense perspective and
3
then the very thoughtful comments by Professor Brown that we
heard earlier in his analysis of the McDonnell case.
So, I think a logical place to start is with our other panelists
here, and what are their thoughts on the significance of the
McDonnell case, its greater meaning, its impact going forward,
or any other approach any of you would like to take. And I hope
someone will volunteer so I don't have to call on someone,
because I have to do that enough with law students. But perhaps
someone will volunteer to share your thoughts on the McDonnell
case, which we can then use as a point of departure for a broader
discussion of public corruption issues.
Kathleen Clark:
I nominate Jennifer.
Jennifer Ahearn:
Well I, gosh, I think I agree it's an open question, as
Professor Brown talked about, as far as the impact of
McDonnell. I think it does remain to be seen what the impact
will be, and I actually think one other question that will really
have a decisive effect on what the impact is, is how do the other
branches of government and the other parts of the government
react to McDonnell? I'm not trying to scoop myself here
because in my presentation later I'm going to talk a little bit
about how Congress might respond.4

1. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
2. Professor Cole is referring to a presentation given by John Brownlee on the trial
of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell as a part of this Symposium. Mr. Brownlee was
one of Mr. McDonnell's trial lawyers.
3. Professor Cole is referring to a presentation given by Professor Brown as a part
of this Symposium to accompany the article published in this Issue. See George D.
Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption Enterprise After McDonnell - Lessons from the
Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 989 (2017).
4. Ms. Abeam is referring to a presentation she gave as a part of this Symposium to
accompany the article published in this Issue. See Jennifer Aheam, A Way Forwardfor
Congress on Bribery After McDonnell, 121 PENN ST. L. REv. 1013 (2017).
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But I do think that one reason that the Court may have
approached the writing of its opinion in the way that it didmaking a suggestion that there are constitutional concerns that it
has, but not going so far as to actually make any constitutional
holdings necessarily-is that I think it wants to suggest that other
parts of the system should be weighing in on these issues.
Whether that is simply to check prosecutors in the future, or
whether there are other parts of the system that should be
weighing in, I think that's one of the reasons why the court
might have taken the step of including that kind of language. So,
I do think we want to-as lawyers, it's easy to look at the courts,
but I think we want to broaden our scope a little bit and look
more broadly to see where else we think the impact will be from,
because I think a lot of important impact will come from outside
of that narrow corridor.
Lance Cole:
Anyone care to follow up on that?

Arlo Devlin-Brown:
I can give you a few thoughts as sort of a former
prosecutor's prospective. I was chief of the Public Corruption
Unit in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York until last summer, when I left for private practice at
But I was chief there while the
Covington & Burling.
McDonnell case was going through the appeals process and I
was also supervising the prosecutions of the legislative leaders of
New York state which I will be talking about later this
afternoon.
But my basic take on the McDonnell case, as a former
prosecutor, is that McDonnell is going to prevent prosecutors
from bringing weak public corruption cases, and frankly those
are not the cases that prosecutors are trying to bring. This
doesn't mean that McDonnell isn't going to have an impact or a
lot of cases that are on appeal where the jury instruction may
have been arguably incorrect. There's things that are going to
have to get worked out through the process as new instructions
are crafted. But fundamentally, McDonnell says that you can't
5. Mr. Devlin-Brown is referring to a presentation he gave as a part of this
Symposium on the prosecutions of former New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon
Silver and former New York State Senate majority leader Dean Skelos.
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bring a case, successfully anyway, against a public official where
your only theory is the public official took money in return for
access, in return for allowing meetings, in return for setting up
meetings.
No good public corruption prosecutor brings a case where
that is the theory. Frankly that wasn't the theory in the
McDonnell case, notwithstanding the issues with the jury
instructions. It's just not attractive to the jury when you're in
your summation saying, "Ladies and gentlemen, this politician
got hundreds of thousands of dollars and what did he do? He set
up some meetings. He never put his finger on the scales of any
governmental decision, but he had meetings." You don't bring a
case like that. Usually, you only bring a case if you have at least
some circumstantial evidence that supports an argument you can
make that the money was given for meetings, sure, but the
meetings were just part of an objective where ultimately the
corrupt deal was the public official was going to influence the
outcome of the government decision. And there's other lawhopefully we'll see how that changes-but there's other law that
makes clear that it's the corrupt bargain that's the crime, and it
doesn't actually matter if the politician ultimately does influence
the governmental outcomes.
It frankly doesn't matter-at least under some statutes-if
the politician ever actually intended to influence the
governmental action. Extortion under color of official right,
which is one of the crimes here, is successfully completedbasically, if you're a corrupt public official and you convince
people to give you money with them believing that you are going
to move government in their direction when you're actually just
going to get the money and not do much. So, I think it is going
to have an impact, but I don't think it's not the sort of sea change
there at the prosecutorial level.
Kathleen Clark:
It would be helpful if someone could explain how the
McDonnell prosecution ended up turning on the governor having
set up meetings rather than the larger endeavor of his assisting
Williams. You say no prosecutor will want the closing argument
to the jury to be based on the defendant having set up meetings.
What was it about the McDonnell case as it evolved that led the
federal government to rely on meetings in its the prosecution?
Do you know?
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Arlo Devlin-Brown:
Yeah, so I'm not intimately familiar with the facts of
McDonnell, certainly not as much as your last speaker. But I do
think the problem in that case for the prosecutors was really the
jury instructions. I don't want to go back and look at what all
the opening and summation arguments were. But I strongly
suspect that their argument was that the object of the scheme was
for this nutrition tobacco guy to get Mr. McDonnell to use his
influence to cause the state university to conduct a study that
they otherwise wouldn't.
The problem was, under the prior understanding of the law
before McDonnell, I'm not sure the prosecutor probably parsed
that out to break down. You know they also argued the meetings
point. The Supreme Court in their ultimate decision-they
didn't say there was insufficient evidence to convict McDonnell
of official acts. They noted, in fact, that some of the things that
McDonnell had been accused of doing would constitute more
than mere acts-an official act. The problem was the jury
instruction was so broad that there was no way to tell if the jury
convicted on a valid basis or not and the Supreme Court kicked it
back to the circuit court to-I think-determine whether there
was sufficient evidence and there could have been a retrial. The
government elected not to do a retrial. I don't know why and
don't have any insight into that.
Kathleen Clark:
Thanks.
Jennifer Ahearn:
Can I just say one more thing about that? Which is I think a
perspective that maybe hasn't been put quite this way yet today,
but I do think this is maybe something that had an impact on
how these prosecutorial decisions were made. Which is, I don't
think that a prosecutor maybe in this case would have seen it
simply as "I just set up a meeting for a constituent." I think they
would see it as "I sold a meeting to a constituent." And while
maybe in the context of this case those things are not different,
because the Supreme Court was so focused on what is the "act,"
and that's the real question. But I don't think that everyone who
looked at this case divorced those things from each other. And
so, the question about setting up a meeting, is it okay for a
government official to set up a meeting for his constituents, sure.
But if what we're saying is it's okay to sell meetings and that's
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what we're really endorsing here, then I think that maybe leaves
open to question if the way that McDonnell came out is actually
going to lead to more meetings happening and more great
constituent interaction that we all want to endorse, which is what
the Supreme Court seemed to say. But I'm not sure everyone
who looks at this case would come to that same conclusion about
what the impact of McDonnell will be in that sense.
Lance Cole:
And I wonder too, I listened to Mr. Brownlee earlier and
he's obviously a phenomenally capable advocate, describing the
case as a bad case that never should have been brought.
However, last night I reread the case in preparing for what we're
doing today, and each time I read the opinion, even as written by
Chief Justice Roberts overturning the conviction, I cringe. You
know, to me the behavior is troubling to say the least. I'm
certainly not wanting to get into a debate with Mr. Brownlee, but
he said-and I think he was echoing the arguments that were
made in some of the amicus briefs-that if inviting someone to
dinner at the governor's mansion can lead to prosecution or
writing a letter on someone's behalf to West Point can lead to
prosecution, then we have a serious problem. And I agree with
that. But I also know, as everyone who has worked in
government and politics knows, that all meetings are not the
same. And if the governor tells someone who works for the
governor, perhaps is a political appointee of the governor,
perhaps wishes to advance their career based upon the
governor's goodwill, "take a meeting with this person," that's
not the same thing as writing a letter to West Point, where
someone can disregard the letter or not. Is the state of the law
now so constricted that everything that is described in the
McDonnell case gets a pass? I certainly hope not, because the
Supreme Court seemed to suggest-as Arlo pointed out-that
the McDonnell case could still be brought. And Kathleen I see
your hand going up over there.
Kathleen Clark:
I want to come back to what Jennifer just said. My
interpretation of Chief Justice Robert's opinion in McDonnell is
that the federal bribery statute no longer prohibits a federal
official from corruptly accepting something of value in exchange
for setting up a meeting with another government official.
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Setting up a meeting doesn't rise to the level of being an official
act, and is therefore not covered by the federal bribery statute.
I'm aghast at the McDonnell decision, and in particular at
the Supreme Court's hostility towards the anti-corruption
enterprise, or at least the criminal prosecution element of the
anti-corruption enterprise. It makes me wonder about anticorruption efforts in the United States more generally, and
whether anti-corruption efforts need to be much more narrowly
tailored to meet the concerns of the Supreme Court. Let me
underline where my uncertainty is. I'm not uncertain about the
scope of the federal bribery statute. I'm confident about that.
What I'm uncertain about is whether other anti-corruption laws
that are not criminal in nature will be reviewed with the same
level of hostility or demand for rigorous scrutiny as the federal
anti-bribery statute was in this context.
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
And just to put one maybe final point on this. I think
you're absolutely right, that the plain reading of the McDonnell
decision is that it is no longer a federal crime for politicians even
to do this. Right? Even to say "thanks for the 100 thousand in
the suitcase and I'm going to set up a meeting with you to go
speak to the head of our university system." That-actually,
let's have it in a contract, it's not going to influence anything,
that's what it is: 100 thousand dollars for a meeting, I think
that's not a federal crime under McDonnell.
But again, from the point of how a prosecutor can still build
a case, come back to your common sense. People don't pay 100
thousand dollars to have a meeting without hoping that there's
going to be some sort of influence about the outcome. And if
you can build a case as a prosecutor where you could have a
witness for that meeting. Say someone from the Department of
Health. Ideally some contemporary emails, so you have the
witness from the department of the university who says, testifies
at trial: "Sir when the governor said to you, 'I want you to take a
hard look at this at your meeting.' 'What did you understand
that to mean?' 'I understood that to mean that we really ought to
do this study.' 'Why did you understand that?' 'Well the last
time he said this X, Y, and Z happened."' And then you have
some emails at the time where he's emailing his subordinates:
"guys emergency session we have do this. Can you find some
room in the budget for a study on this?" And those sort of things
do happen.
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Now that's not conclusive evidence, but I think a
prosecutor-a good prosecutor with that evidence in their hands
can get past the McDonnell threshold and can argue, survive a
motion to dismiss I think, and argue to a jury that this was not
money just for a meeting, which is not a crime. But the corrupt
deal was money for the governor or the public official to set up a
meeting and use his soft influence to make sure that some
governmental action will happen.
Lance Cole:
What about the federalism aspect of this? Professor Brown
made reference to it earlier and this has been a part of an issue in
federal anti-corruption law and policy forever. "The feds"
coming into states or local governments and imposing their own
views of propriety and morality, and legality for that matter. As
we heard earlier this morning, what Governor McDonnell did
was apparently not a crime and was permitted under Virginia
law, so do we want to leave this issue of public corruption and
particularly state and local officials, to the states, or do we want
federal officials to be able to exercise oversight here through
criminal law enforcement?
And I think, Kathleen, part of the concerns that the
Supreme Court expressed seems to turn on that issue. They
seemed troubled by that idea, and even Justice Breyer's
comments showed a great deal of concern about the federal
officials looking over the shoulder of state officials. Personally,
I'll throw my view out and turn the floor over to others. There
are lots of areas I think, where it's a good idea-and we're
probably going to see a lot of this-to allow the states to be
laboratories of progress and new ideas, but I'm not sure
corruption is one of those. I think we might prefer to have a
uniform standard of corruption, and not let Arkansas-and I'm
from Arkansas so I can say Arkansas-or New Jersey or
Louisiana or Illinois set the standards, so any comments on the
federalism aspect of this?
Kathleen Clark:
Concern about federalism is one way to explain the
motivation for the court's hostility towards the anti-corruption
enterprise in this case. That may be part of what motivated the
Court to scrutinize McDonnell's prosecution the way that it did.
While that may have been a motivation, I don't see how it played
into the Court's analysis, because the Court ended up gutting a
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statute that applies to federal officials, the federal bribery statute,
in the process.
This decision turns on three features, three elements, that
weren't actually part of this case. The first element is the federal
bribery statute.
McDonnell wasn't a federal official, but
nonetheless the Court's analysis turns on the federal bribery
statute's definition of an official act. The second element is
federalism. It's not clear how federalism actually plays a
doctrinal role in the analysis, as opposed to a motivation for the
court's hostility, or attitude. And third-I did have a third, and it
wasn't the Department of Energy. 6 The third element is
campaign finance doctrine. In reading the decision, you'd think
that the Court was troubled by the possibility of prosecutions like
McDonnell's hobbling elected politicians who have to raise
campaign contributions in our system of privatized campaign
finance.
If you hobble a politician's ability to obtain campaign
contributions, that could be seen as an attack on democracy.
But, of course, this case didn't involve campaign contributions.
This case involved personal gifts. Our democracy does not
depend on the ability of elected politicians to receive gifts.
There is no public benefit when the governor of Virginia
receives a Rolex watch. Whereas, you could claim, and many
people believe, that there is a public benefit from campaign
contributions going to politicians because they facilitate more
speech about the campaign. But there is no public benefit from
private gifts to public officials.
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
One thought I had on the federalism question is-I think
both before and after McDonnell-it's not a binary thing.
There's this real interplay between federal and state corruption
laws, and state conflict of interest regulations in particular. And
the reason I say that is, in order to make a federal corruption
case, frankly in order to make most federal white collar cases,
the hardest issue always for the prosecution is to prove criminal
intent and specifically intent to defraud, intent to deceive, to hide
something, right? So, the federalism sort of answer here is when
states adopt stronger conflict of interest rules-disclosure
rules-those things make it such that a politician who wants to
6.

Rapster, Perry Forgets Third Agency, YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www

.youtube.com/watch?v---YdS7HGOIk
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get the illicit gifts, who wants to have an illegal, obviously
incriminating string of outside income, they either have to
disclose and make public, in which case hopefully there is some
political response. Or they lie. And if they lie and they leave it
out that makes prosecuting them federally, and probably under
state law, for bribery a lot easier, because it's a lot easier to say,
"Ladies and gentleman was this really politics as usual? Is this
something the person thought was fine at the time? Then why'd
they lie on this form?" And we'll actually talk about that a little
bit later on Silver and Skelos. So, I think there is a great role for
the states here if they care about these issues to tighten up their
conflicts of interest rules.
Jennifer Ahearn:
And I would just say one other thing on federalism, and I
think the federal McDonnell case is a good example of this.
Let's just posit that Governor McDonnell actually did corruptly
receive these gifts and it was illegal under Virginia law at the
time. Under what scenario would he have been prosecuted under
Virginia law? How would that have actually have happened? I
mean, we know there were Virginia police who were
investigating him, but I think we could all understand how
maybe the Attorney General of Virginia might not be, in some
situations, all that inclined to bring this prosecution. And those
kind of practical difficulties get swept up in the federalism
conversation, but I'm not sure they have exactly the same set of
concerns, or that they implicate the same set of concerns as
federalism in other contexts.
Lance Cole:
And that's exactly where I was planning to go next. The
question is, to what degree should these kind of cases be left to
state officials to prosecute and the feds should step out and let
the state and state law enforcement do the job? Or, to extend it
to its greatest either libertarian or democratic extent, let the
voters decide if someone is too corrupt for public office. Then
the voters will answer and can vote them out. I personally don't
have great confidence in either of those approaches, but I'm
happy to hear the views of the other panelists on those points.
Jennifer Ahearn:
I guess I'll bring up the McDonnell case as another
example, which is: how would the voters in Virginia have ever
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found out about any of this? I don't really understand how that
would happen-again as a practical matter I don't really
understand how that would have happened. I'm not sure the
mechanism really works. Do you have to wait until something
bad happens to the people of Virginia because of the corrupt
actions that are taken by the official? Ultimately some other
study doesn't get done by the medical school, and another drug
doesn't get approved, or this drug gets approved and it shouldn't
have and people are harmed. And then the investigation goes
back and we learn-oh wait this should have never been
approved in the first place, and was only approved because this
person was making money off of it. Well, do we really want to
wait until those kind of things happen?
Lance Cole:
Or rely on the press to find it and write a story about, you
know, a close friend of the governor gets favoritism and
therefore the voters don't like that and speak at the next election.
Kathleen Clark:
I want to flag a philosophical point. In a sense, relying on
voters can be seen as voters consenting to a conflict of interest
that would otherwise violate a fiduciary duty. If we believeI'm not sure the Supreme Court believes this anymore-but if
we believe that public officials are in a position of trust, that
they're supposed to act on behalf of the public, that they're in a
fiduciary position, then there certainly are situations in which the
beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship can consent to what would
otherwise be prohibited conduct under the common law. This
notion of relying on voters can be seen as an example of the
beneficiary-the voters-consenting to what would otherwise be
prohibited conduct.
You've already identified some of the weaknesses ' of
relying on voters in those circumstances. There are situations in
which the law says it won't allow a beneficiary to consent to a
conflict because no reasonable beneficiary would consent to that
kind of arrangement. You could actually conceive of the bribery
statute as that kind of limitation: one to which the voters cannot
consent. The bribery statute removes the option of allowing
voters to consent to bribery by criminalizing it.
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Arlo Devlin-Brown:
Yes, on the question of sort of multiple prosecutors in the
federal versus state level, I think there's a valid point there that,
sometimes, it's going to be challenging for state officials of the
same party to feel as comfortable bringing a case against a
powerful official who has a key role in the state. And sometimes
the federal prosecutor is much more independent from state
politics. So, I think federal prosecutors can play a role, and I
think there are many state attorney generals, district attorneys,
who do very impressive work in the area.
As to letting the voters decide, I agree with all the points
that are made. There's also something fundamental about the
voters and the democracy and that is, in the end, reform in the
political system requires the voters to care and there are states
where there's been systemic corruption problems and there may
be there good government groups that advocate for solutions to
those problems. And yet-it could be gerrymandering whatever
else, it could party machines in different counties-but some of
the same sort of people who are not necessarily reform-minded
keep getting elected. And until something becomes an issue
where the voters kind of get angry about it and motivated about
it, I think systemic reforms to the conditions that give rise to
corruption at the state level or at the federal level are
challenging.
Lance Cole:
We've talked a lot about focusing on the McDonnell case,
but we could also look at what the Supreme Court has done
generally in this area, and Professor Brown made reference to
this earlier. But I was thinking back to the relatively recent
Supreme Court cases that we have, Sun-Diamond, with the
gratuities-the federal gratuity statute; 8 the McCormick case
with the Hobbs Acto and political contributions; and, of course,
the Skilling" case on honest services fraud; and now we have
McDonnell, which I think Kathleen correctly says takes a big
chunk out of the federal bribery statute. And, myself and
speaking only for myself here, I look at those cases and they are
all very different and factually complex, and they involved
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010).
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different statutes with different applications, but there's a
commonality here where the Supreme Court is both, and perhaps
rightly so, enforcing very strict rules of statutory construction or
analysis and reading the statutes very narrowly.
But, at the same time, there's this tendency to gravitate to
this quid pro quo requirement, where you have to prove a quid
pro quo-in some cases, it has to be explicit and in other cases it
can be implicit-but we're left with a body of law where you
have to show a quid pro quo in order to obtain a criminal
conviction. And that can be-in my view at least-very difficult
because a lot of corruption doesn't rise to the level of a quid pro
quo. I'll throw that out to the other panelists to comment on.
But, conceptually, you do scratch your head a bit, and I heard
this from some of the other comments, and say what is the
Supreme Court doing and why are they doing it here, and I don't
know the answer to that.
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
I think you have a point that Professor Teachout, who has
written a book about corruptionl2 in America, has made, that the
sort of current federal criminal-and I think in large part state
criminal-model of corruption being a quid pro quo is not
necessarily the common understanding of corruption. Not
necessarily as what the founders understood it to mean. I think
changing the federal law there's not a lot-other than the
passage of new laws-not a lot can be done and I'm sure we'll
get to this on the noncriminal law level, in terms of ethic rules
reforms, civil powers, there's things that can be done.
Before we, I let this go, one thought I have, and I'm no
Supreme Court scholar, or scholar at all, about the recent
Supreme Court cases. I think one thing that sort of unites
them-Skilling and McDonnell and some others-and it's not
really a pure liberal versus conservative line. I think one thing
sort of unites them is that, as things ebb and flow, there's sort of
growing distrust on the Supreme Court of prosecutorial
discretion and the fair exercise of prosecutorial discretion. And
you see that from very conservative judges and you see it, to a
degree, from liberal judges. And I think that's a concern that
motivated Skilling, McDonnell, other cases as you have these
statutes that are very broad on their face, and that the Supreme
12.

ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA:

SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).

FROM

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S
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Court sometimes worries about. If you read the McDonnell oral
argument it's visible there, they're talking about scenarios where
what if someone gives someone ball tickets and then is it going
to be a big corruption case and they're worried about the
discretion.
As a former prosecutor myself, one thing I think sometimes
the Supreme Court doesn't have as much perspective on is the
reality of actually bring a successful prosecution, and you can't
do it unless you actually have good evidence of a quid pro quo
that sounds corrupt. If someone went to a minor league ball park
and that's the only benefit and then got a 500 thousand dollar
contract, yeah I suppose a prosecutor can bring that case, but it's
not going to be successful because no one is going to think just
because they went to a ball game together that that's a sufficient
benefit to the public official that they would violate every other
rule and give huge amounts of state money. So that's how I sort
of see the Supreme Court cases.
Kathleen Clark:
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court shows an astounding
solicitude for the class of people in this country who give gifts to
elected officials as a way of achieving a political or personal
goal. The Court doesn't want to interfere with the process of
providing ball tickets or other benefits to elected officials. Is the
Supreme Court's concern about abuse of prosecutorial discretion
broad enough to reach other people who aren't in the habit of
giving their elected officials such gifts? Who are the defendants
in Skilling and Sun Diamond and McDonnell? What did these
defendants have in common? Is the Supreme Court's concern
about prosecutorial discretion broad enough or deep enough to
reach other types of defendants?
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
I guess it was strong enough to reach this fishing boat guy who
ripped up his "form." 13
Jennifer Ahearn:
I actually followed that issue from in my prior work with
the United States Sentencing Commission, so sort of looking at
the Supreme Court on criminal issues more broadly and I
actually think that it has been-well we'll just say this: I think
13.

Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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the Supreme Court has been the most defendant-friendly court in
the entire country on sentencing issues, many of which involve
prosecutorial discretion. You know at the heart of this is-the
Armed Career Criminal Act, for example, is really vague and so
let's dig into that-and one reason that's a problem because of
prosecutorial discretion and how that statute is used. So, I
actually do think there is some of that, but it may be for different
justices, they approach that differently. So maybe it's a situation
in which a certain justice doesn't feel that way about the Armed
Career Criminal Act but they do about certain other defendants.
But I do think that there are some justices on the Supreme Court
for whom you could say that does apply across different
defendants.
Lance Cole
It could be an extension of a clever argument, and I can't
remember who made it, suggesting that the best way to predict
the outcome of a Fourth Amendment case, a search and seizure
case, [in the Supreme Court] is whether a majority of the Justices
could imagine themselves being subject to that kind of treatment
and therefore would be troubled with it. The point, Kathleen, I
think you are making, is that they can imagine themselves in the
position of the defendants in one of these cases had their careers
taken a slightly different turn. They're aghast at the idea, so I
see a lot of that in the opinion as well.
Jennifer Ahearn:
And I actually see maybe sort of a flip-side as well, which
is that they could see themselves in that situation, but most of
them at this point have never been in that situation and so I think
there's also, at least I think we see this in Citizens Unitedl4 and I
would argue that you see it in McDonnell as well, a sort of
disconnect with how do public officials actually do their jobs.
And how do they actually interact with their constituents in a
noncriminal way? How realistic is the concern, "gee I'm not sure
I can take these baseball tickets because some federal prosecutor
will come and make a case out of it." And I'm not sure the
Supreme Court can see themselves in that situation in a way that
is helpful to them in making those distinctions.

14.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

1042

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

Lance Cole:
Well again, to go in a slightly different direction, there is
some level of concern, at least among some people, about the
efficacy of criminal law going forward. We should probably
think a bit about the ability of politicians to police and control
themselves, and we're fortunate to have on the panel the
preeminent expert in the country on that-Kathleen. Do you
have any thoughts in terms of-and I'm thinking about not only
the ethics component, but I'm talking about our national
government, the ethics committees in the House and the Senate,
but we also have the Office of Congressional Ethics and the
Office of Government Ethics, which has had some publicity
lately. And I guess the question, that I'm not doing a very good
job of articulating it here, is how effective can we hope that will
be-to fill the void to the extent there's a void here?
Kathleen Clark:
I guess that I would predict that there will be a
constitutional challenge to an attempt to enforce noncriminal
government ethics standards. We've already seen out of the
Trump White House an assertion that federal ethics standards
that apply across the executive branch do not apply of their own
force to the White House personnel.15
The same mindset that came up with that theory will likely
look at the McDonnell decision, the Court's hostility towards the
anti-corruption enterprise, and the dumbing down of the
definition of corruption, reducing it to bribes and kick-backs, and
will assert that other ethics restrictions violate one or another
right or assert the government doesn't have the authority to
impose such restrictions. Such a challenge could come from this
White House, but it could also come from the state level. So, I
would look for an opportunity to use this line of argument as a
defense in an anti-corruption or ethics enforcement matter.
Lance Cole:
Arlo, to what extent do federal prosecutors look at these
kind of cases and say, "well maybe this is not right for us to
handle as a criminal matter and we should leave it to whatever,
the body is to their own self-policing"? Does that enter the
15. Letter from Stefan Passantino, Deputy Counsel to the President, White House
Counsel, to Walter Shaub, Dir., Office of Gov't Ethics (Feb. 28, 7 2017)
2
(https://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=3477259-WH-to-OGE- 8Febl ).
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calculus at all when federal prosecutors are trying to make the
determination to use scarce prosecutorial resources to bring a
case?
Kathleen Clark:
In the Southern District, in the last week, say.16
[Laughter]
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
Yes, so for a federal prosecutor, when you're looking at
these things and, first of all, you have to see if the statutes, which
are not super far reaching, apply. You have to see if you can get
evidence of the elements but I think there is also a gestalt thing
which to some significant degree tracks sort of the intent element
as to whether this really sounds in criminality, and I think again
that's why I think ethics regulation are sort of key. And I hear
your point about that constitutional challenges could be there.
But ethics regulations are key because I think they help, first of
all, and second of all, when there's a known regulation that
someone chooses to violate, and perhaps hides their effort to get
around it, that can be good evidence of intent.
Another thing-and again this is campaign finance, a whole
different animal-which I agree the Supreme Court in fact
conflated with gifts in McDonnell in a way that's unprecedented,
but I think there's also a distinction probably that prosecutors
draw as to whether someone is getting campaign money in return
for governmental favors or whether they're getting personally
enriched. And I think you can still-I mean the Supreme Court
has said it, if you put different decisions together-you can still
make a federal corruption case with the quid being a campaign
donation but you have to show an explicit understanding of that.
But I think the reality is there's something just very viscerally
different between someone who is perhaps-in a way that maybe
makes people sad as citizens of a country-doing favors
aggressively for campaign donors versus someone who is
16. Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Acting U.S. Attorney Joon
H.. Kim Statement on the Investigation into City Hall Fundraising(Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-us-attorney-joon-h-kim-statementinvestigation-city-hall-fundraising (acknowledging the "difficulty [of] proving criminal
intent in corruption schemes where there is no evidence of personal profit"
and announcing that federal prosecutors would not bring charges against New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio).
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opening a Swiss bank account and buying a yacht. There's
something that just feels really more viscerally criminal, and I
think that's something prosecutors think about when they
analyze these cases.
Lance Cole:
I want to leave time for questions from the audience, but
there is one other issue we might address. We obviously have a
new presidential administration and a new landscape in
Washington, and one of the things that President Trump has said
he wants to do is change the way Washington works-"drain the
swamp"-and try to improve the public's perception of the way
government works. If each of you could suggest one thing to
President Trump, have his ear and have him act on it, what
would you suggest? Or what could be done that could best help
him fulfill his campaign promise to drain the swamp in
Washington? Don't everyone answer at once. Or maybe there's
nothing the President can do because we do have to remember,
theoretically, the Justice Department is supposed to operate
independently from the White House, and political staff are not
supposed to interfere with law enforcement, ongoing
enforcement matters-but please, go ahead, Jennifer.
Jennifer Ahearn:
Perhaps, if you all are familiar with the organization I work
for, you'll know what I'm going to say. But I would suggest that
the President divest from his businesses and address that
situation and maybe some other things that are related to that.
But to set a tone at the top that says this is important and this is
something that I take seriously, because I think what-one thing
that's true about the ethics enforcement mechanisms that we
have that you mentioned, you mentioned a number of things, but
you know each of them is sort of self-contained within its own
branch and it relies on enforcement within that branch. So, if
you don't have the person at the very top indicating to the folks
within that organization that this is something important that is to
be taken seriously, I don't think you can expect those
enforcement mechanisms ultimately to bear fruit.
Lance Cole:
And to build on that point, and this is for all the law
students in the room because you on the panel of course all know
this. But in the corporate world where there's been a great deal
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of attention to corporate wrongdoing and policing corporate
misconduct, I think that without exception all the studies and all
the analyses show the single most important thing is the "tone at
the top," the top executives and the culture that they create and
the examples that they set. And so, I think what we have been
through in the corporate world with wave after wave of scandals,
starting with insider trading scandals in the 80s and 90s and
going through the mortgage crisis and up to the present, shows
that the tone at the top is the most important thing, so I think
there's a lot of support for your point out there.
Kathleen Clark:
Well, I was stumped at first by your question.
Lance Cole:
No I don't believe that.
Kathleen Clark:
No, I was, and then I realized that you were asking me to
imagine that we could move that mountain. Before Trump was
inaugurated, I was trying to think of what I would have to say
about all of this. I was thinking that I could go in one of two
directions. First, I could write an op-ed in which I would give
advice to Donald Trump about what he needs to do. He needs to
divest, which is exactly what you said. It's entirely clear. A
second approach would not be advice to Donald Trump, but
advice to Congress. Congress needs to get into action and reimpose the conflict of interest statute on the president. This is a
president unlike any we've ever seen in our lifetimes.
I presented these two options to a friend, and she told me
not to bother with the first option. Trump is not taking advice,
so I should go with the second option.' 7 Obviously, Congress
hasn't yet taken my advice about re-imposing the conflict of
interest statute on the president either.
But I want to
acknowledge that within the 50 or 60 days that President Trump
has been in office, I've gone from imagining that we could
influence him in some way, to thinking of him not as the

17.

Kathleen Clark, Opinion, Congress needs to restrict the president'sfinancial

conflicts, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/con
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recipient of advice, but more like an object that appears to be
nearly immovable.
We need to strategize about how this object can be moved.
Forget giving advice to this President, although there's nothing
wrong with that. Instead, what I find compelling is strategizing
about how non-government organizations like CREW,
journalists and citizens can engage Congress to put pressure on
the President to take action.
Arlo Devlin-Brown:
I don't have any specific policy suggestions. I wouldn't
really wade into that, but I will say that this sort of antiObviously
corruption mission-it really is non-partisan.
partisans on any side seize opportunities they see on their
opponent's issues and make a partisan thing of it. But I think,
broadly speaking, the public, across party lines, doesn't like
corruption and it causes people to lose their faith in government.
And I'm thinking a little bit of my own recent former boss, Preet
Bharara, but I think public figures of any stripe who can
convince the public that they care about corruption and in a
nonpartisan way and will pursue it-I think they-a leader like
that-can attract a lot of public support. So, I-the only thought
is keeping anti-corruption as a focus has advantages to the public
and I think has advantages to those who take that position.
Lance Cole:
And I think you raised a very interesting issue for the
future. Which is if you look back over the three preceding very
different political administrations, the Obama administration, the
George W. Bush administration, and the Clinton administration,
in general the Department of Justice has had a fairly uniform,
consistent approach, and fairly aggressive, [approach to fighting
political corruption]. There may have been peaks and valleys,
ups and down, but overall a fairly uniform prosecutorial policy.
Will that change going forward, who knows? But it will be
something interesting to watch both as academics and just as
citizens. I throw that out, but Kathleen I saw that you wanted to
add something, so please do so.
Kathleen Clark:
I would, actually. The way you were speaking, I agree with
you. I think you were speaking about normal times. But these
are not normal times. I believe that this administration, this

2017]

QUIS CUSTODIETIPSOS CUSTODES? A PANEL DISCUSSION

1047

White House, is acting as though its goal is to undermine public
trust in government.
The overarching goal isn't just
deconstruction of the administrative state, but destruction of
public trust in government. At least there is evidence of that.

Lance Cole:
And historically perhaps the part of the government where's
there been the strongest prohibition against improper [political
interference]-of course there can be political policy decisions
made as to resources and priorities-but any kind of interference
in the prosecutorial function or in particular cases [at the
Department of Justice] has always been seen as completely offlimits. And I'm not sure if even that might be up for grabs as
well, going forward. By that I mean there have been times
that-you go all the way back to the Teapot Dome Scandal, for
example, you can see things [at the Department of Justice] we
would never countenance today. What the future holds I don't
know in this area. Any questions for our panelists from the
audience? Or any comments?
[The panel then took questions from the audience, which are not included
because the questions were not picked up by the microphone].

